Between 1999 and 2003, Madrid added 47 miles to its metro system for $7.2 billion in today’s dollars—about $150 million per mile. In 2017, after 10 years and for approximately the same price, New York City completed the first 1.7 miles of its Second Avenue Subway. On a per-mile basis, it was the most expensive subway project ever built. 

But America’s exceptionally high transit costs are not inevitable. The U.S. is the wealthiest country in the world. The fact that it pays more than lower-income countries is no surprise. Yet, while American costs are three times as high as the international average, they are six times as high as in developed countries like Spain and South Korea. If U.S. funds went as far as they do in France—a developed economy with roughly average costs—we could deliver more than twice as many projects for the same level of spending. 

Thanks to research from the Transit Costs Project, the Eno Center for Transportation and others, we know the drivers of our cost problem. Outdated procurement laws prevent transit agencies from adopting better practices; insufficient agency capacity leads to overreliance on consultants with little incentive to limit costs; utilities and local governments demand exactions in exchange for necessary permits; federal requirements prioritize box-checking over efficient project delivery and delay important planning steps; over customization and overdesign absorb scarce funds; and permitting laws treat emissions-reducing transit infrastructure with a presumption of environmental harm. 

The Transit Abundance Playbook presents 15 solutions to address these problems. In it, experts ranging from transit practitioners to advocates, consultants and researchers identify evidence-based solutions to empower transit agencies and improve their capacity to deliver.  

Another proposal would streamline third-party approvals, addressing the morass of potential veto points that can block linear infrastructure like transit lines. In order to build, transit agencies must negotiate with many different stakeholders, including utilities, local governments, asset owners and other government agencies, each with their own demands—and often, each with the ability to hold up the project. The Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority negotiated 43 separate third-party agreements for the BART Silicon Valley Phase II project.

In another glaring example, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority paid for a new police kiosk for the city of Beverly Hills, Calif., in exchange for necessary street closure permits. While third parties have legitimate interests and priorities, the individual negotiations that agencies must undergo give disproportionate leverage for delay and value extraction.  

The playbook’s solution would borrow from Italy’s “Conference of Services” model, empowering a single decision-maker—such as a member of the governor’s office—to convene all stakeholders and negotiate an agreement up front, with stakeholders that fail to raise substantive concerns forfeiting the right to litigate afterward. Such a process would create certainty for agencies while respecting the needs of third parties and could shave years off project timelines. 

Faster, more cost-effective construction will only deliver results if paired with adequate funding for both construction and operations. But reform complements funding by ensuring that the money agencies receive builds as much transit and creates as much access for riders, as possible. Regardless of how much any lawmaker wants to spend on transit, there is bipartisan agreement that any dollars allocated should go as far as possible. 

Other countries’ successes show that high transit costs are a policy choice. The Transit Abundance Playbook authors present solutions to make a better one.