Another example of pulling people together from within their cylinders of expertise are the VIPR operations that Administrator Pistole mentioned. And in Connecticut, I just have to give thanks to our TSA partners. In 2009, we had 34 VIPRs. By the end of this year, we expect to have increased that sevenfold.
These VIPRs do not happen without the leadership of a TSA federal security director coming out of the comfort zone and working with other federal, state and local partners to make it happen, and it's a big success in Connecticut. I'd like to see more support on that.
Another example of pulling people out of their silos of expertise or cylinders of expertise is the Intelligence Fusion Center. In addition to the traditional partners -- state police, DHS, FBI -- we also have a fulltime TSA intelligence analyst. And I don't know how many of the 72 fusion centers have a full- time TSA analyst. We do in Connecticut. I hope by mentioning that I have not put that in jeopardy because we want that person to stay.
That is their primary work location, and it gives us tremendous information exchange, not just with the state, we have full-time municipal police detectors whose primary job location is in our fusion center. That allows us to marry them with the great work of TSA, pulling information into our fusion center.
And lastly and probably most importantly is engaging the public. We have a very substantial See Something, Say Something campaign that's running for two years in many different media routes, but I certainly agree the next step is to go beyond seeing and saying and doing something.
And I think we have a great example in the area of emergency medical response, and that is publicly available defibrillators. If we talked 30 years ago about allowing members of the public to operate a defibrillator, I think we would react in horror. But today, we do that. We've come that distance.
And I think we can do the same in the area of security by engaging the public not only to see and say, but also to do, and that's a great principle of resiliency. It's an example of adapting if we can get to that next step of helping people do something.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to answering questions.
LIEBERMAN: Thank you very much, Commissioner Boynton. That was very helpful.
Finally, we'll go to Steve Flynn, a former Coast Guard commander and now president of the Center on National Policy. Steve has been a really terrific resource for this committee over the years, and we welcome you back with gratitude for your testimony today.
FLYNN: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, and Senator Landrieu, Senator Paul. It's an honor to be here today.
What I'd like to do is to offer a bit of an analytical perspective about the threat, why I think this hearing is so important, and then speak to a few don'ts, I would suggest, about how we approach this issue, and then some ideas about the do's -- where we go from here.
You know, I would offer up at the outset that we really are still at the starting line. And as with so much in Washington, we can always evaluate priority by what we spend, and the numbers are pretty clear on this one. We spend, on average, $9 for every passenger who flies, and the estimate for -- for the same amount of money that we spend on transit is a penny or a little less. So it kind of tells us where we are in terms of what we've been willing to invest in.
Now, this isn't that we should replicate the model that we do in aviation and do a very expensive effort with regard to transit. The heart of my testimony here today is to say, in fact, this is an opportunity, since we're still at the starting line, to potentially recalibrate the approach.
I want to specifically speak to -- to the threat and why I think that we really need to step up our focus on this area. And it's not simply because we have pulled out, as we just laid out at the very outset of -- of your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, that we know Osama bin Laden had been plotting and thinking about the transit system. We have the very explicit examples from around the world of attacks since 9/11 on those systems.